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Heap buffer overflow in libvpx
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5217
Heap buffer overflow in vp8 encoding in libvpx in Google Chrome prior to 117.0.5938.132 and libvpx 1.13.1 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)
Keeper Security may have been impacted by this vulnerability in the Desktop App since we use the Electron framework. As a precaution, we immediately updated to Electron framework version to v22.3.25 and published Keeper Desktop version 16.10.9.
If you have any questions, please email us at security@keepersecurity.com.
Heap buffer overflow vulnerability in the WebP Codec
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-21449
Heap buffer overflow in WebP in Google Chrome prior to 116.0.5845.187 allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical).
Keeper Security may be impacted by this vulnerability in the Desktop App since we use the Electron framework. As a precaution, we immediately updated to Electron framework version to v22.3.24 and published Keeper Desktop version 16.10.8.
If you have any questions, please email us at security@keepersecurity.com.
Response to CVE-2023-36266
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36266
A researcher filed a CVE (CVE-2023-36266) in regards to the scanning of local memory when using Keeper Desktop and browser extension software.
We have disputed this CVE. Keeper performs quarterly pen testing with 3rd party experts including NCC Group, Cybertest and independent security researchers against all of our products and systems. Keeper has also partnered with Bugcrowd to manage its vulnerability disclosure and bug bounty programs. As part of our testing, we explicitly test the storage of secrets in memory while our applications are in use, and when logged out. Keeper removes all decrypted vault data from memory upon logout and provides settings to also wipe memory and restart the app upon vault auto-lock. This functionality has been verified by our pen testers and the test results are available for customer review.
As with any software product, if an attacker controls the local computer, the attacker can perform any action the user or an application could perform. In the case of a password manager, if an attacker can read arbitrary memory, then an attacker can read decrypted contents of the password manager while the application is in use. This applies to any password management product. Security researchers understand that a fully compromised device scenario has severe implications for the user.
Keeper has multiple security mechanisms in-place to defend against compromised end-user devices. Keeper client software only decrypts the user's vault upon successful login, and only stores decrypted values during use in volatile memory. When a user is logged out or timed-out, decrypted values are removed from memory. In addition, the Keeper desktop application provides a setting in the "Security" screen which forces a full application restart upon auto-logout, to ensure that data is cleared upon locking. In the case of a web browser such as Chrome, Keeper requests the clearing of memory after logout, however the memory management of the underlying browser is outside of Keeper’s control and can sometimes take time for the memory management system to complete this operation.
With all end-user software, it's important to ensure that users reduce the risk of a compromised device by following security best practices, keeping all software up-to-date and installing adequate antivirus / malware protection software.
Keeper has stood by its commitment to protect your most valuable data for more than a decade, through our best-in-class Zero-Knowledge and Zero-Trust security model and transparent approach to sharing it with the public. For information regarding Keeper's security and encryption model, please visit:
https://docs.keeper.io/enterprise-guide/keeper-encryption-model
If you have any questions, please email us at security@keepersecurity.com.
Response to "AutoSpill" report from Black Hat EU 2023
A presentation at Black Hat EU 2023 discussed credential stealing on mobile password managers. Keeper was listed as an impacted application. Keeper has safeguards in place to protect against this issue as described below.
On May 31, 2022, Keeper received a report from the researcher about a potential vulnerability. We requested a video from the researcher to demonstrate the reported issue. Based upon our analysis, we determined the researcher had first installed a malicious application and subsequently, accepted a prompt by Keeper to force the association of the malicious application to a Keeper password record.
Keeper has safeguards in place to protect users against automatically filling credentials into an untrusted application or a site that was not explicitly authorized by the user. On the Android platform, Keeper prompts the user when attempting to autofill credentials into an Android application or website. The user is asked to confirm the association of the application to the Keeper password record prior to filling any information. On June 29, we informed the researcher of this information and also recommended that he submit his report to Google since it is specifically related to the Android platform.
Generally, a malicious Android application would first need to be submitted to Google Play Store, reviewed by Google and subsequently, approved for publication to the Google Play Store. The user would then need to install the malicious application from Google Play and transact with the application. Alternatively, the user would need to override important security settings on their device in order to sideload a malicious application.
Keeper always recommends that individuals be cautious and vigilant about the applications they install and should only install published Android applications from trusted app stores such as the Google Play Store.
A screenshot of Keeper's protection in place is displayed below. A user is prompted to trust the application from retrieving and filling the specified credentials. This security feature has been in place for several years and no additional updates are required.
This simple Android app demonstration can be viewed on Keeper's public Github repo: https://github.com/Keeper-Security/android_webview_autofill
To learn more about how to keep your smartphone safe, please visit: https://www.keepersecurity.com/blog/2022/10/13/how-to-keep-your-smart-phone-safe-and-personal/
If you have any questions, please email us at security@keepersecurity.com.
Detailed release notes for Keeper Security software on mobile, web, desktop and backend platforms.
Keeper Security posts all release notes, relevant JIRA ticket numbers and links to product documentation on every release.
Release notes:
SSO Connect On-Prem (SSO Cloud is part of Backend API)
Keeper is ISO 27001, 27017 and 27018 certified. Keeper is GDPR compliant, CCPA compliant, HIPAA compliant, FedRAMP and StateRAMP Authorized, PCI DSS certified and certified by TrustArc for privacy.
Security and encryption documentation is published online here.
Bitwarden vulnerability with biometric key storage
Bitwarden Windows desktop application versions prior to v2023.4.0 store biometric keys in Windows Credential Manager, accessible to other local unprivileged processes.
Keeper is not impacted by this issue. To ensure that we were not impacted by a similar vulnerability, Keeper contracted a 3rd party penetration tester in July 2023 to validate our protection against this type of attack. The report PDF is posted below:
If you have any questions, please email us at security@keepersecurity.com.
Solutions to common Keeper issues and questions based on platform